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12 may 2026

Ricoh: The Forgotten Fourth Sister of Japanese Watchmaking

In 1962, while Seiko conquered the world and Citizen democratized time, a camera company decided to make watches. Ricoh bought Takano Watch, launched an automatic with 45…

In 1962, while Seiko conquered the world and Citizen democratized time, a camera company decided to make watches. Ricoh bought Takano Watch, launched an automatic with 45 jewels—more than many Patek Philippes—partnered with Hamilton for electric watches, created its own Japanese “Rolex President” for $500, and in 1971 launched quartz before Citizen. Then, it disappeared. It didn’t bankrupt. It wasn’t absorbed. It simply decided photocopiers were more profitable than competing with Seiko. This is the story of the fourth sister of Japanese watchmaking, the one that had everything to succeed and chose not to.

The Company from Photosensitive Paper

Tokyo, 1962: An Unexpected Acquisition

On May 8, 1962, Ricoh—famous for cameras and photographic paper—buys Takano Watch Company. It wasn’t an obvious decision. Ricoh dominated optics. Takano made ultra-thin watches since the 1940s. The merger seemed strange until you understood the logic:

“Watchmaking and photography share the same obsession: capturing time with absolute precision.”

Ricoh wasn’t starting from zero. It inherited calibers like the Takano 544 and, more importantly, a philosophy: making technically superior watches at popular prices. The new conglomerate, Ricoh Watch Ltd., had industrial muscle and technical ambition.

What it didn’t have was fear.

The Battle of the Jewels

October 1962: 33 Jewels That Changed Everything

Ricoh launches the Dynamic Auto with caliber 54710. The specifications are absurd for a mid-price watch:

  • 33 jewels (a Rolex Datejust had 26)
  • Instant day-date change
  • 18,000 bph frequency
  • Modular architecture from Takano base

But Ricoh doesn’t stop. In a move that only makes sense in the context of the Japanese “prestige battle,” it evolves the caliber to 54722 by adding a ruby ball-bearing system in the rotor.

Total: 45 jewels.

The 45-Jewel Paradox

Did an automatic watch need 45 jewels? No. Did it significantly improve performance? Marginally. Was it brilliant marketing? Absolutely.

“More jewels than a Vacheron Constantin for the price of a luxury Timex.”

Hamilton-Ricoh: The Electric Marriage

1962-1964: Lancaster Meets Nagoya

Parallel to the Dynamic, Ricoh signs a joint venture with Hamilton Watch Company. The structure is fascinating:

  • Hamilton (60% ownership) provides electric technology from caliber 505
  • Ricoh assembles in Japan with the new 555E caliber
  • Target: sell to American military bases in Asia

The result is electric watches—not automatic, electric—with the problematic reliability of the Hamilton Electric but assembled with Japanese precision. It’s a technical oxymoron: fallible American technology built with Japanese perfectionism.

The Predictable Failure

The JV lasts barely two years. In 1964, the partnership dissolves. Leftover movements are sold as “Hamilton Vantage” in the United States. Ricoh learns a lesson: innovation without market is just an expensive experiment.

Medallion: The Rolex President Japan Actually Wanted

The Salaryman’s Day-Date

While the Hamilton JV collapsed, Ricoh developed its commercial masterpiece: the Medallion line. It was shamelessly obvious in its inspiration:

  • 36mm Rolex Day-Date style case
  • Fluted bezel
  • President bracelet
  • Day and date at 3

The Medallion 40Y President Automatic Day/Date was, without disguise, an homage to the most aspirational Rolex. But with Japanese caliber of 17-21 jewels, solid construction, and a price of $500 in today’s money.

1971: Quartz Before Citizen

Riquartz: The Last Bet

In 1971, Ricoh launches its first quartz watch. For context:

  • Seiko had launched the Astron in 1969
  • Citizen would launch the Crystron in 1973
  • Ricoh was second, not third

The Silent Goodbye

Mid-1970s: The Decision

There’s no official death date for Ricoh Watch. No bankruptcy. No dramatic absorption. Simply, sometime between 1975 and 1978, Ricoh Corporation looked at its numbers:

  • Watches: 8-12% margins, fierce competition
  • Cameras: 15-20% margins, technical leadership
  • Photocopiers: 25-30% margins, corporate dominance

The decision was obvious. Watchmaking had been a laboratory, not a destination.

Conclusion: The Fourth Sister’s Lesson

At KLASSE Timeless Elegance, we believe there’s beauty in honest attempts. Ricoh didn’t fail; it chose to withdraw. Its watches—those Dynamic, Medallion, electric experiments—aren’t relics of defeat but artifacts of calculated ambition.

When you hold a Ricoh Dynamic 45 jewels, you’re not holding a dead brand’s watch. You’re holding the product of a company that still exists, that dominates global printing, that simply decided 45 jewels didn’t compensate for competing with Seiko.

That brutal honesty is, paradoxically, the most Japanese thing about Ricoh: knowing when to fight and knowing when to bow. The watches they left behind aren’t orphans. They’re graduates of an experiment that went exactly as planned.

The best invested time is the one you know when to end.

Instagram Version

The Japanese brand that had everything and chose to leave

1962: Ricoh buys Takano. Launches automatic with 45 jewels (more than Patek). Partners with Hamilton for electrics. Creates its “Rolex” for $500.

1971: Launches quartz before Citizen. It’s winning.

1975: Looks at numbers. Watches: 10% margin. Photocopiers: 30%. Goodbye watchmaking.

Didn’t bankrupt. Chose to leave while still respectable. Today a Dynamic 45j is worth 500€. Not for nostalgia. For respect to those who know when to retire.